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Deciles’ Average Income as a Variable to Anchor Politicians’ Wage 
 
 
Abstract: We propose deciles average income, deficit and natural resource rents as objective 
variables to measure politicians’ economic performance. We begin by reviewing the literature 
linking politicians and their institutional choices to the macroeconomic environment. To 
continue, we review the relation between those macroeconomic variables and income 
percentiles. In order to evaluate how well they sum up politicians’ performance, we then use 
the variables previously reviewed to throw a generalized least squares estimation from panel 
data in a set of countries. Our results point towards the possibility of using those variables to 
anchor an incentive contract for politicians. 













Nestor Pitrola, an Argentinian politician, recently declared following an increase on 
governments wages: “a legislator should gain four minimum wages, and if he wants to gain 
more, then he shall raise that wage”. While his message might seem righteous, politicians’ well-
being should be connected to the people’s welfare, the variable he would use to anchor their 
wage might not be adequate. An increase in the minimum salary will not forcefully signify an 
improvement in the population living conditions. Moreover, many studies have found that 
politicians pay attention to monetary incentives. Caselli and Morelli (2004) theorize that 
increasing the monetary reward will improve the selection of politicians and that bad candidates 
could want to lower the “honest” reward to decrease competition. Additionally, Ferraz and 
Finan (2009) conduct a natural experiment exploiting the wage difference of legislators in 
Brazilian municipalities and find strong evidence that higher wages not only increase political 
competition and quality of the legislators, but also that their performance is affected positively. 
In order to reduce their diverging interests, the first economist to theorize the possibility of an 
incentive salary for legislators was Gersbach (2002); he proposed that politicians that run for a 
second term should be paid depending on the success on their first term in order to encourage 
forward thinking policies. Nevertheless, Gersbach didn’t propose which variables should 
influence the legislator's wage; he gave unemployment as an example and let the door open for 
additional research. 
This investigation seeks to find a mix of variables that, together, could fit into Gersbach 
(2002,2003) models. The variables we propose are average income inside each percentile to 
account for the present state of the economy, as well as natural resource extraction (or rents) 
and public deficit to account for future economic developments. The main object and 
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contribution of this research is to show why deciles average income might be an adequate 
variable adequate to anchor an incentive contract for politicians. More precisely, we will 
analyze the characteristics of an incentive wage for politicians and study if economic variables 
that politicians can control in the short run affect income percentiles. If percentiles can in fact 
be influenced by the legislators’ decisions over the economy and can be considered a good 
picture of the present state of an economy, then they could be an acceptable variable to assess 
politicians’ performance, and by extension to anchor their wage. 
The logic behind the structure of our research is the following: we will review literature linking 
politicians’ interest or their institutional choices to the macroeconomic environment in order to 
find the variables over which politicians have control. Since those variables can be manipulated 
by politicians, they are the variables we will later use for our regression; if the variables that 
politicians can manipulate are also the ones that define average income inside deciles then 
average income inside the deciles can be an adequate measure for their performance. Before 
throwing the regression, two procedures will be necessary. First, to review the economic 
literature linking those macroeconomic indicators to income percentiles in order to put a basis 
to our estimation. And secondly, we will enumerate the qualitative features an incentive 
contract for politicians needs to have and for each feature explain why income deciles might be 
a good choice to anchors politicians wage in accordance with Gersbach (2002,2003) models. 
Our estimation will include 𝐶𝑜2 emissions, inflation, unemployment, net trade, government 
consumption, natural resource rents and foreign direct investment. Then, we will present and 
discuss our results, which show evidence that income deciles are highly dependent on those 
variables and point towards the possibility of those anchored wages. To conclude, we will 





II. Literature Justifying the Variables used. 
 
In this section, we will review some of the extensive literature on how diverging interests of 
legislators affect the economy, leading to non-optimal policies. The variables to be found 
influenced by politicians and their institutional choices will be the ones we later use for our 
income deciles estimation. 
Starting with the budget, Buchanan and Wagner (1977) defend the theory of fiscal illusion 
where the electorate overestimates the advantages of running a deficit and do not foresee the 
tax burden in the future. Governments would take advantage of the myopic electors and follow 
expansionary policies during pre-electoral times. 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) theorize that governments, with the uncertainty of elections, may 
also over expend in providing for their political agenda, expecting the next government having 
to reduce the expenditures designated to their propositions in order to pay debt commitments. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) provide a more complete review of the relation of public choice and 
debt where they conclude that the electoral system is a determinant variable in the debt path of 
a country.   
Politicians seem to be motivated by re-election and by ideology, Alesina (1989) shows that 
those motivations bring socially undesirable outcomes. Variables such as inflation, budget 
deficits, unemployment, and output may follow partisanship and electoral cycles. Therefore, 
conservative governments tend to fight inflation, and consequently, create recessions, 
especially if they have inherited a high inflation. While, left-wing governments tend to decrease 




In this same line, Aisen and Vega (2005) use a GMM estimator and a fixed effects estimator on 
panel data for 100 countries and a period of 39 years. They find strong evidence that political 
instability and variability affect inflation and unemployment. The idea behind is that, because 
political instability and variability increase the risk of finishing their term earlier or make re-
election more unlikely, politicians’ behavior might be affected to seek short termed goals, 
generating inflation and consequently, seigniorage. 
The development of a country highly depends on its capacity to attract investment, and, as we 
will show, its attractiveness highly depends on institutional choices. While the negative 
relationship between taxes and investment is well known, Lawless (2012) finds that a 10% 
reduction in tax complexity has an equivalent elasticity with foreign direct investment as a one-
percentage-point reduction in effective corporate taxes rate. 
Overall, the World Bank has seven criteria for an Ease of doing business ranking:  possibility 
of starting a business, facility of getting credit, investors protection, tax system, openness to 
trade, facility to enforce contracts, and resolving insolvency, all of them strongly connected to 
the rule at law and legislature. Canare et al. (2016) review the literature on all of them showing 
the importance of each of these institutional characteristics for investment. 
Natural resource rents are known to distort politicians’ behaviour by giving them less 
accountability and creating faction fighting for a share of the revenue. Abundance of natural 
resources is also known to promote a rent-seeking culture and a patron-client system of 
governance. Brollo et al. (2010) use random audits done on Brazilian municipalities and data 
on the funding of those municipalities to realize a regression discontinuity design. They find 
that there is a positive correlation between higher exogenous revenues and corruption; this 
would be due to higher revenues giving more space to politicians for being corrupt without 
disappointing voters. Additionally, they find that if corruption is more attractive to individuals 
with a worse outside option, then less prepared individuals will select themselves into politics. 
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Moreover, because his opponents are now of lower quality, a low-quality individual can afford 
to grab more rents while increasing its re-election probabilities. Many mechanisms have been 
identified for natural resources to affect, through politicians, a countries growth and stability. 
To review the strong influence of politics on the ‘resource curse’ or the ‘political resource 
curse’, please refer to Deacon (2011). 
Environmental agreement on Co2 emissions are born under the hypothesis that legislators have 
some control over this variable. Dietz et al. (2015) show that states in the US where elected had 
been more time in the environmentalist movement tend to decrease their emissions despite their 
populations or affluence. They manage to show a causality between the politicians’ green record 
and environmental protection, concretely, with Co2 emissions. 
Another area where the preaching of economists and the practice of politicians differ is 
international trade. Very often pressure groups can manipulate politicians to over regulate 
imports to avoid international competition. One of the most accepted theories for this 
divergence comes Grossman and Helpman (1992) that theorize it comes from lobbies’ interests 
becoming a reality fuelled by their political contributions. Caves (1976) shows that politicians 
would tend to create barriers to trade in industries having a larger number of employees since 
those employees are also voters; it would be a type of clientelism. The literature on this relation 
is extensive, for an empirical review of all the mechanisms at play, refer to Gawande and 
Krishna (2005).  
Dimant and Tosato (2018) do a state-of-the-art review on institutional, jurisdictional, societal, 
and economic problems affecting corruption and its consequences backed on theoretical and 
empirical research. Among the causes, they find natural resource endowment, where a higher 
endowment leads to higher corruption, this supports the hypothesis that its extraction should be 
limited in some way, without even taking environmental factors into account. Trade openness, 
economic prosperity, education and transparency are negatively correlated with corruption; 
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while, government stability is U-shaped, because a government that stays too long in power can 
create long-term relationships with the private sector. Consequences of corruption are many: 
bureaucratic inefficiency, worsening of investment climate through inefficient public investing, 
reduction of civil and human rights, decrease of foreign investment and economic growth, loss 
of human capital due to lower education and, even brain drain, due to outcomes of corruption 
inducing skilled labor migration. Corruption seems to impact society at all levels. 
Politicians often seem to follow a different agenda from the rest of the country and have an 
important impact on the overall well-being of the citizens. As it was shown in this section, 
politicians’ behavior will reflect on important indicators; very often sub-optimal policies will 
be followed. If those indicators are what drives income deciles, then an incentive to maximize 
them could motivate legislators to have a better management of those variables. Following these 
insights, the next section will put a basis to our estimation by focusing on the existing studies 
on deciles and their functioning. 
 
III. Interaction Between Macroeconomic Indicators and Income Deciles 
 
In order to have some precedents for our estimation, we will review research done on income 
deciles. Generally, those studies are done indirectly by using the Gini index or the 9th to 1st 
ratio. 
A famous study on this matter comes from Garbinti, Goupille, and Piketty (2017). They use 
fiscal data, national accounts, and household surveys to observe the evolution of inequality in 
the long term (more than a hundred years). They employ measures related to deciles such as the 
shares of income of the bottom half of society. They show through numerous graphics and 




Results of studies focusing on the Gini index must be interpreted differently. Sarel (1997) 
realize a cross-country analysis of the, until then, vastly unknown relation between the Gini 
coefficient and other macroeconomic variables. His data are based on household surveys 
covering the totality of the population and all income source. One of his more interesting 
findings is that inflation and public spending do not affect income distribution. This does not 
forcefully mean that these indicators do not affect income, only that they affect every decile by 
a similar percentage.  
Maestri and Roventini (2012) study some inequality indicators such as the Gini index or the 9th 
to 1st proportion over time. They focus on a small set of countries to identify common patterns 
as well as country specificities. They organize their study as follows: they test for the 
stationarity of the inequality series to test for shocks having permanent effects finding that 
indeed inequality series tend to be non-stationary. This would imply that deciles functioning 
cannot be captured in individual time series. Then, they search for possible cointegration 
relationships between the macroeconomic series and inequality data where they find few 
results, and finally, test for Granger causality between the variables. As expected, 
unemployment effectively affects inequality, which makes sense since in general it will be 
present in the last deciles. While, they find that in some Europeans countries, a higher 
government consumption could be granger causal for more inequality. They theorize this could 
be due to institutional differences between countries. 
Deyshappriya (2017) use a GMM estimation of some macroeconomic variables on income 
share of the quintiles of 33 Asian countries for 20 years. His main findings are that an initial 
GDP increase redistributes the share of the poorest quintile to the others, while further increase 
decrease the share of the richest quintile to redistribute it to the rest. In addition, inflation would 
affect the share of those at the bottom in favor of the share of the rich. Then, unemployment 
affects all quintiles, except the richest, negatively. Moreover, improving terms of trade favors 
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the richest and third quintile. Another interesting finding is that education decreases inequality. 
One could expect that these results could be similar to the ones in our study; the fundamental 
difference resides in the fact that we focus on levels rather than on shares. We are measuring 
richness and not inequality. In Deyshappriya’s benchmark every improvement or worsening for 
any quintile must mean the opposite for another, while in our regression it does not forcefully 
have to happen. Our results will show that in absolute terms, an indicator can affect all deciles 
in the same direction. 
On the following section, before passing to our estimation, we will review the necessary 
features for an incentive wage for politicians to be feasible, and, how deciles income could fit 
into this scheme. 
 
IV. Specificities of an Incentive Wage for Politicians 
 
To be able to analyse the variables we propose, we need to refer to Tirole (1974) where he gives 
a list of reasons for politicians to have low powered incentives. We will discuss each of his 
points in the interest of justifying why we propose those variables as an adequate measure: 
- The multidimensionality of their task: a legislator does not only have economic objectives, 
they are also to be judged by their social and cultural policies. Gersbach (2002) idea is that 
since social and cultural policies cannot possibly be assessed, we can let their salary depend on 
economic performance. In the meanwhile, the rest of their tasks could be controlled by the 
already existing incentives described by Laffont (2000); the legislative and executive branch 
being regulated by the judiciary branch (with limited power due to incentives reasons) and by 
the re-election mechanism.  
11 
 
- Heterogeneity of tastes: even by reducing the scope of the salary to economic performance 
only, voters might not all agree on which economic variables should be the most important, and 
even in which direction should they go. We expect that the preferred sign and direction of 
macroeconomic indicators depends on the different interests of the population. For this reason, 
we propose income percentiles where there is no ambiguity that a higher level means a better 
outcome. On the other hand it is desirable to achieve this goal by using the least possible natural 
resources and minimizing the deficit (maximizing surplus). With these variables there would 
be consensus on the sign; therefore, the only heterogeneity of tastes would arise from the 
importance given to each variable in the determination of the salary. This difficulty leads us to 
the next argument. 
- Variables weights: even with some variables to anchor the salary on, it is necessary to choose 
the importance of each variable on the final wage.  A potential theoretical solution would be to 
maximize aggregate utility in dependence of politicians’ utility function. In practice, as Gerbach 
(2002) proposed, it could be translated by politicians offering themselves, before the election, 
the weights for their salary to be indexed; and in a second step, voters would choose the 
politicians that proposed the salary that fits best their preferences. The economic success of a 
policy depends on which is the measure of its success, this idea would allow us to have a 
measure of success democratically chosen by society. Additionally, our variables fit into this 
scheme more than macroeconomic indicators directly controlled by politicians because putting 
weights on indicators would require a lot of technical knowledge, while the weight given to 
each decile would depend on personal preferences. The knowledge requirements would be 
transferred to lawmakers, who would be incentivized to maximize deciles income. Because, as 
we will show, deciles already capture the tradeoff between indicators. One could argue that 
politicians would choose higher weights on deciles that are easier to raise. As Gerbach (2003) 
notes: “Standard Bertrand argument suggests that two politicians competing for office would 
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offer a first-best contract”.  In addition, if voters tend to vote for putting weights in their own 
decile, then politicians end up with a wage equally distributed for all deciles, and this would be 
the welfare function of that society. The cost of this scheme is additional noise than by 
anchoring it directly on the macroeconomic indicators, therefore the risk bared by politicians 
increase. These insights guide us to our next consideration. 
- Impossibility to compare using yardstick competition or relative performance evaluation, as 
in the private sector, makes politicians vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Apart from natural 
disasters, we can hardly imagine percentiles decreasing dramatically without the government 
having some degree of responsibility. Moreover, as in contract theory, having a fixed part in 
the salary could decrease the risk that they would bare. The fixed part would have to depend on 
the legislators’ risk aversion, how much control they actually have over income deciles, and the 
wage being anchored on variables growth or levels. Gersbach (2003) finds that incentive 
contracts for the second term will also be helpful despite the noise in between terms as long as 
re-election chances decline with poor past performances.  
-Dispersed ownership of parties: with parties presenting a clear objective for an outcome, rather 
than a mean to achieve not forcefully spoken outcomes (clientelism), the political spectrum 
might become clearer. Therefore, the median voter rule would gain validity, since people will 
be able to vote on their outcome preferences instead of voting in policies of which they do not 
completely understand the effects. Also, since their wage would depend on achieving their 
objectives, it would represent a more credible promise. Having a more credible commitment 
would allow political parties to deviate from inadequate policies that they implement anyway 
because it looks from their side of the spectrum or they have incentives to do so. 
Additionally to Tirole’s remarks on the specificities that an incentive salary for politicians 
should have, the main characteristics of any incentive salary include that its variables should: 
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-Be as objective and have as low manipulability as possible: inflation and unemployment levels 
strongly depend on the methodology used to measure them. Income deciles have fewer ways to 
be measured and once you agreed on one measure they will be clear and less affected by external 
factors. 
 - Not provide perverse incentives, as an example, anchoring the wage on unemployment could 
lead politicians to raise inflation. This is also a reason why we do not index the salary directly 
on the studied macroeconomic indicators: income deciles capture the tradeoffs between 
indicators. To illustrate, society can hardly propose an indexation on inflation, and 
unemployment that would lead to an optimal level, while anchoring it on percentiles would 
allow having the right balance between conflicting indicators: the ones maximizing income 
deciles. 
- Objectively sum up the work of the employee even if he does not have complete control over 
the outcomes. For example, in contract theory, very often profits follow statistical laws. We 
will test this characteristic quantitatively. On the next section we will present the data and 
methodology used. 
 
V.  Data and Methodology  
 
On the following section we portray the employed data and the methodology used to analyze 
deciles income before passing to the presentation of our results. We use data on share of the 
GDP per deciles from the World inequality and income database (WIID) to find the average 
income of each decile. We select all countries available based on the next criteria: quality of 
data, coverture of all country and not only urban or rural areas, and for the same country, the 
data must belong to the same source. We use 42 countries from Europe and the Americas (list 
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of countries in annex 1) from the year 2005 to 2014. We rule out selection bias because we do 
not consider there is a correlation between the way these indicators affect deciles and their 
availability. Different countries might have data from different sources but following as closely 
as possible the guidelines on the use of secondary data by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), we 
follow the same source through the years for a country indicator. To find the average income 
of each percentile we use population and deciles’ share of GDP data from the WIID and the 
GDP data from the World Bank.  Our dependent variable to approach average income inside 




            (1) 
Where GDP is the countries’ gross domestic product in current US dollars (2017) converted 
using single year exchange rates and 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖 is the share of GDP possessed by the 𝑖
𝑠𝑡 decile. 
The main assumption of our model is that the deciles respond to the indicators, while the 
indicators are not affected by the deciles; there is no reverse causality. The explanatory 
variables we will use, are, as we have seen earlier, the ones over which politicians have 
consistent control. In table 1 are available the variables we use, their explanation and a reminder 
of the paper that justifies its choice. 
Table 1: Variables for the Estimation 
Name Variable Justification 
Co2Em Refers to the emissions of 𝐶𝑜2 in metric tons per capita. 
Existence of environmental agreements imply that 
politicians have control over this variable. 
Dietz et al. (2015) 
 
Infl Inflation in percentage points for annual consumer prices, 
reflects the price change for a given basket of goods. 
Alesina (1989) 
Aisen and Vega 
(2005) 
 
Unemp Unemployment in percentage points of labor force. 
 
lnNr Log of total natural resource rents, as the sum of the rents 
of oil, natural gas, coal, and forest rents. It is used as a 
proxy for natural resources expropriation, where higher 
rents indicate a higher expropriation. 
Deacon (2011) 






lnGovCons Log of expenditure on government consumption, includes 











lnTaxes Log of net taxes on products, or indirect taxes, this variable 
indicates the sum of taxes on products collected minus 
subsidies. Relate to production, sale or purchase of goods 
and services. 
lnFDI Log of foreign direct investment if positive, or, minus log 
of the absolute value if negative. Includes net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than the investor. 
Lawless (2012) 




lnTrade Log of net trade if positive, or, minus log of the absolute 
value if negative, includes the net trade of goods and 









We do not consider additional variables under politicians’ control, because they would affect 
deciles already through their affection on indicators as showed for corruption by Dimant and 
Tosato (2018). To begin our estimation, we perform a Hausman test (annex 2). It indicates that 
fixed effects are more appropriate for our analysis than random effects with a 99% confidence 
level. This is favorable since for the objective of our study it is more interesting to study 
evolution over time rather than a comparison between countries.  
Suspecting there may be autocorrelations between error terms and that the variance of the 
residuals may not be the same across countries, we realize two tests. First, we test for serial 
autocorrelation using the method proposed by Wooldrige (2002) and formally tested and 
implemented by Drukker (2003), who asserts that the test is adequate for reasonably sized 
samples, confirming that the residuals must be treated (annex 3). 
Then, an LR test indicates us the presence of heteroscedasticity (annex 4). Therefore, we use a 
GLS transformation similar to a Cochrane-Orcutt estimator, but without first differencing, and 
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we correct our variances for heteroscedasticity. We use an AR (1) process including the 
independent variables variation in the following form (annex 5 presents the proof that it meets 
Gauss Markov Assumptions): 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝜌𝑖𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑎𝑣𝑔 + 𝛽(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑣𝑡            (2) 
Where 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and −1 < 𝜌 < 1. 
We represent our set of independent variables levels as 𝑋𝑖,t where i=1…10 represents the decile, 









Table 3: Regressions deciles 6 to 10. 
 
 
Before going into the interpretation of our results, we need to mention that because of the 
structure of the estimation, literal interpretation of the coefficients is not possible without 
knowing 𝜌𝑖 for each regression (from 0,61 to 0,7 in annex 6). Additionally, each coefficient 
represents the importance of the exogenous variable growth and not its level, which allow us to 
assert that politicians can control them. Nevertheless, these coefficients are all comparable 
between them, and their significance is valuable. The autocorrelation coefficient 𝜌𝑖 also 
represents the percentage of the deciles income not explained by the growth of our explanatory 
variables. From 60% to 70% of deciles income level is explained by its past level, while the 
rest, including its growth, is explained by the independent variables.  Politicians may not have 
complete control over variable levels, but as shown before, they have control over their growth 
and direction. The possibility to manipulate 40% of a decile (or more since they can grow) 
through those variables seems to be more than enough to anchor their salary and even, not incur 
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too much risk relatively to other professions, since deciles are at least 60% as big as the year 
before.  Furthermore, the autocorrelation coefficient seems to be increasing with deciles, which 
is evidence that poorer deciles depend more on political decisions (percentually).  
At first glance, most of the coefficients seem to have a significance above 95% at least. They 
also seem to grow with each decile. This seems reasonable since the dependent variables are in 
absolute terms, if we used the logarithmic level of deciles (annex 7) you could see that 
coefficients are decreasing, because one more dollar in the richest deciles represents a lower 
percentage. This result highlights the importance of the salary to be anchored on absolute levels 
rather than on relative levels, since then an additional unit of currency would have a different 
effect on the salary not only depending on its weight but also on its relation to others, which 
would increase tradeoff between deciles without offering any advantage to it. 
 Moreover, 𝐶𝑜2 seems to have an important impact on a country’s income distribution, it is 
important to remember the unit used to measure this variable to avoid exaggerating its 
importance. This result seems to be logical, a higher level of emissions indicates a higher level 
of industrialization. If it was the other way around environmental agreements would not be 
necessary. Since  𝐶𝑜2 is a global pollutant, the electorate might not feel its reduction as 
advantageous, especially if other countries also do not reduce it either. Therefore, individually, 
a country’s population would prefer not to include it on the contract. International agreements 
could try to give personal incentives to those who sign it by including into the agreement that a 
part of the wage must be indexed on this variable, bringing politicians to have an additional 
incentive to honor those commitments between countries. 
The insignificance of inflation appears strange at first, however considering that income deciles 
are in “current US dollars”, therefore corrected from inflation, it just adds to the economic 
theory of neutrality of money, inflation does not seem to have any effect on purchasing power. 
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Another possibility is that, depending on the situation of the country, inflation can have opposite 
effects which net out in a cross-country benchmark. It is however appealing that if we extend 
the confidence level to 90%, it would be significant until the 5th poorest decile. This result is 
interesting since one of the dangers of this incentive salary would be that politicians could be 
motivated to increase inflation in order to increase their salary, which in this case would have 
an opposite effect, especially if it is highly anchored on the poorest half of the population. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to make a similar study with the variables in local currency 
units. 
Then, we can see that, confirming the natural resource curse, whether it is due to the Dutch 
disease, or to political reasons, the more a country has natural resource rents, the lower will the 
income of each decile be. Besides all the social problems resource extraction brings to society, 
the rents it brings do not seem to be helpful; there is an evident need to limit its use. Having a 
part of the wage negatively indexed on this variable would not only help to protect the 
environment, but judging on these results, would also be positive for growth. Furthermore, we 
note that unemployment is negative for every social class, while it might affect the poor mostly, 
it is the product of firms firing their employees, it is a good indicator of an economies’ shape.  
However, it is an indicator that we could have expected to have opposite directions depending 
his side on the deciles scale. This is also a positive result for our purpose since it reduces the 
tradeoff between deciles; no matter the weights, legislators would have an interest in managing 
the indicators in the same direction. 
 For the rest, there are no surprises in the sign of the coefficients; we see investment and 
government consumption are important, as taxes should be minimized. We allow ourselves to 
hypothesize that private investment would go in a similar direction as foreign direct investment. 
The coefficients for government consumption and taxes might seem too strong compared to 
foreign direct investment, but we can see that in absolute values, the tax’ coefficients are pretty 
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close (still lower for all deciles) from the government consumption, subtracting one from 
another we could see their real value of public consumption in the absence of deficit. 
Interestingly, trade affects in its majority the middle deciles; it could be that the middle class 
lives more from exports and imports. Anyway, as most of economic theory predicts, additional 
openness to trade brings additional income to the country, while often, internal pressures will 
motivate politicians to put barriers to trade. 
The most important result for our purpose is that income deciles depend on the most important 
macroeconomic indicators that are at some degree controlled by politicians and that they have 
the same sign for all. Therefore, the tradeoff between deciles is minimized and, while an 
incentive salary might not maximize the revenue of some deciles depending on their weights, 
it should not affect them negatively. 
We conclude this section by remarking that deciles average income is dependent on variables 
controlled by politicians and that they seem to be a possible measure for the performance of an 
economy. For these reasons, it seems income percentiles are a possible variable to anchor 
lawmakers’ wage, improving their monetary incentives, and possibly reducing their moral 
hazard. 
 
VII. Additional Considerations 
 
We are now going to discuss some of the practical features and characteristics of this anchored 
wage and resume some of the elements before discussed.  
To begin the discussion, we must explain through which mechanism this salary may affect 
corruption. While this salary may not create a direct incentive for bad politicians to stop being 
corrupt, since the potential gains are much bigger than any salary politically feasible in a 
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democracy, anchored wages would make each politician dependent on the decisions of his 
neighbour. As Gonçalves (2018) shows, using the perception of corruption as a proxy and ethnic 
heterogeneity as an instrumental variable, without corruption the PIB per capita in Brazil would 
be 30% higher and the income per capita in each country of Latin America would be on average 
3.000$ higher. This mechanism would create an additional incentive, besides group reputation, 
for honest politicians to further investigate their colleagues and even to improve institutions 
and transparency. It is important to note that the higher the salary is anchored, the higher the 
fluctuations, and therefore the monetary incentives, will be. 
Two pertinent remarks are necessary, first percentiles do not need to be measurable in the short 
run, the politician's wage could change only once per year. Secondly, there could be a threshold 
in between the ‘legal salary’ put at the beginning of the term, wages could only surpass or go 
under the threshold during the term. Entering politicians do not have to pay or to gain from their 
previous colleagues’ performance. 
The wage could be indexed in two different ways. It could be directly dependent on deciles 




= 𝑊                           (3) 
Where 𝛾𝑖 are the weights, 𝑋𝑖 are percentiles levels and W an arbitrarily decided wage, it could 
also be a threshold for the wage to be in. Politicians would choose their weights in order for 
this equation to be equal to some initial threshold, then, during the term, weights stay the same 
while percentiles levels would vary, and therefore the wage varies. This method would have 
the advantage that it makes sure the weights put on the salary will not have an exaggerated 
variability. 
Another method would be to choose an initial wage that varies with deciles growth: 
𝑊 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑍𝑖
10
1
                         (4) 
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Where W is still an initial wage, 𝛾𝑖 are the weights, and 𝑍𝑖 represents percentiles growth in 
absolute terms after the elected officials assume their positions (both methods have a wage that 
is initially equal to W since 𝑍𝑖 begins at 0). The advantage of this way is that it allows choosing 
the relative importance of each decile without having to worry that the initial weights multiplied 
by percentiles level are equal to the given initial salary. Moreover, the wage must be anchored 
on absolute levels since anchoring it on relative levels between deciles would allow politicians 
to increase their salary by decreasing the salary of those at the top (increasing the salary of the 
poorest deciles relatively to the richest).  
For the sake of the example, using income deciles threshold in adults equal split per household, 
with the first method if we take  𝛾1 = 8.4  and all other weights 𝛾𝑖 = 0, then, W = 33.763 R$ 
which was in 2014 the wage of a legislator in Brazil. By 2015 the salary would have decreased 
to 15.093 R$ per month. If, we used the second method, keeping the same W, and we gave 
equal weights to all deciles 𝛾𝑖 = 1 then their salary would also have decreased by more than a 
half to  15.086 R$. Overall, their salary would have strongly decreased for any possible 
combination, while what actually happened is that their compensations have only increased.  
Concerning the interaction between tasks Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) find that when there 
is interaction between tasks you should raise or decrease the incentives on the measurable task 
depending on them being substitute or complementary. In this case, it can go both ways: having 
a good economy raise probabilities of re-election, but some cases may present a tradeoff 
between popularity and wage increase.  Another of their findings is that activities non-
considered in an incentive scheme will be neglected. We need to point out that this wage would 
come only as an additional incentive, all the existing incentives, such as re-election would be 
maintained. Education and health care, while could improve percentiles level in the long term, 
would have to still rely on current incentives scheme. 
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One of the most important topics discussed in this paper is the reasons to why create noise 
attaching the wage to percentiles instead of directly to macroeconomic indicators. 
Subsequently, a summary of the reasons: Percentiles do not conflict with taste heterogeneity 
since there is consensus that the higher they are, the better. Additionally, the population would 
need a lot less technical knowledge to choose a weight on percentiles, since it would mainly 
depend on personal preferences. Even economists have trouble to agree on the optimal level of 
inflation. In this way we would have a two-step process, deciles maximization defines the 
optimal level of the variables, then the public choose which percentiles of the country are to be 
given priority. Finally, the possible methodologies used to capture percentiles are much less 




We proposed to modify politicians’ incentives using a pay-for-performance contract anchored 
on deciles average income or income deciles, public deficit, and natural resource rents. We have 
reviewed politicians’ incentives and some of their effects in society to show that they are the 
managers of the macroeconomic environment of a country.  We chose our variables based on 
previous research showing how politicians can manipulate macroeconomic indicators. After 
analyzing the literature focusing, directly or indirectly, on income deciles, and, reviewing the 
specific characteristics needed by an incentive contract for politicians, we did our own 
estimation. We found strong evidence that all deciles are dependent in the same direction on 
macroeconomic indicators affected by politicians. More importantly, almost all coefficients 
were highly significant for all deciles, which would make them an adequate variable to judge 
politicians’ present performance. Besides the proposed scheme that can be beneficial for the 
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population of each country individually, we theorized that including some weight to be 
anchored on 𝐶𝑜2 in international agreements could give them additional credibility. To finish, 
we reviewed some practical considerations of this scheme. Gersbach (2003) puts the theoretical 
basis to this idea by considering politicians facing multitasks problems and shows that 
competition for elections with incentives contracts might alleviate political inefficiencies. 
Nevertheless, there is still a lot of research to be done to confirm that this could be implemented 
one day. It would be interesting to re-run this estimation using instrumental variables that are 
directly affected by politicians (such as the number of bureaucratic procedures to open a 
business) on the macroeconomic variables (such as investment). Moreover, a theoretical model 
that already considers these variables for the wage to be anchored and whether such an incentive 
wage, considering costs and benefits, is likely to perform better than just voting with a fixed 
wage would be the next step in this topic. Furthermore, a model studying the mechanism 
through which it would decrease corruption and an expansion on the discussion of the practical 
issues would help to understand better the possibilities and technical considerations. 
Undoubtedly, all these issues deserve further investigation. However, it arises as natural that, if 
we want to improve competition in our society, one possible path is by improving it around 
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Annex 1 : List of Countries 
 
 
Annex 2 : Hausman Test  
 
 






Annex 4 : LR test for heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Annex 5 : Demonstration that Equation 3 meets Gauss-Markov assumptions with first order serial 
autocorrelation 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 =  𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + µ𝑡 
(=) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
(=) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡-1𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡-1 +  𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 
(=) 𝜌𝑖𝐷𝑖,𝑡-1𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝜌𝑖𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡-1 +  𝜌𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 
(=) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 - 𝜌𝑖𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑣𝑡 
(=) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔 =  𝜌𝑖𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1𝑎𝑣𝑔 + 𝛽(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑣𝑡 
 





























Annex 7 : Logarithmique Regressions 
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